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The Case of USAir’s Acquisition 
of Piedmont Aviation 
Stacey R. Kole and Kenneth Lehn 
Somewhere along the line a strong carrier, instead of 
becoming stronger by acquisition, is going to merge itself into 
weakness, and maybe this [USAir transaction] is going to be it. 
-Edmund  Greenslet, Merrill Lynch (19 February 1987) 
5.1  Introduction 
In November 1987, USAir Group acquired Piedmont Aviation for $1.6 
billion in a cash tender offer. The acquisition, which remains the largest 
airline merger in history, transformed USAir from a regional airline into 
a major national airline. Comparably sized, USAir and Piedmont had the 
two highest profit rates in the industry and reputations as strong regional 
airlines that had thrived under deregulation. Following the integration of 
the two carriers, the new USAir incurred huge operating losses, became 
the least profitable major airline, sustained a large reduction in its stock 
price, eliminated its dividend, and came close to bankruptcy. We examine 
USAir’s acquisition of Piedmont and its postmerger performance to ad- 
dress the following question: How can the combination of two highly prof- 
itable firms dissipate so much value? 
Figure 5.1 shows USAir’s stock price performance from 1978 through 
1995. From  1979 to 1986, the first eight years of  airline deregulation, 
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Fig. 5.1  USAir’s cumulative monthly net-of-market returns, 1978-95 
USAir experienced a cumulative net-of-market return of roughly 75 per- 
cent. In February 1987, USAir announced its bid for Piedmont. Although 
Piedmont was acquired in November  1987, integration was delayed for 
regulatory and labor-related reasons until August 1989. Almost immedi- 
ately thereafter, USAir’s costs rose, productivity and customer service de- 
teriorated, and in the year following August 1989, USAir’s stock price fell 
from $54 to $21.375. Within five years of the completion of the Piedmont 
merger, USAir had destroyed more than $2.5 billion of shareholder value. 
We conclude that the major source of USAir’s value destruction was the 
strategy it used to integrate the Piedmont and USAir workforces. This 
integration  was  further complicated  by  USAir’s acquisition  of  PSA,  a 
smaller California airline, for $400 million at roughly the same time. Be- 
fore the acquisitions, the workforces at the three airlines had different pay 
scales, work  rules, and cultures. After the acquisitions,  USAir  faced a 
choice: maintain these differences within the firm or standardize the labor 
contracts and cultures of the three organizations. 
USAir opted for the latter. Attempting to buy labor peace, it brought 
the Piedmont and PSA employees under the more generous pay scales and 
work rules of USAir’s collective bargaining agreements. This raised labor 
costs substantially and lowered the productivity of the newly acquired air- 
lines. In addition to adopting uniform labor contracts for the three work- Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of Value in Mergers  241 
forces, USAir used a “mirror image” strategy to homogenize the opera- 
tions  of  the  acquired  airlines  in  order  to  expedite  Federal  Aviation 
Administration (FAA) certification of the acquired carriers. However, the 
policy extended beyond regulatory requirements and “turned out to be an 
irritant  to everyone-PSA  and  Piedmont  employees and  their  custo- 
mers.”’ 
The USAir case, and perhaps airline mergers more generally, provides 
evidence consistent with Williamson’s (1  985) conjecture that the bound- 
aries of the firm are limited in part by considerations of “internal equity.” 
Williamson raises the oft-asked question, “why can’t a large firm do every- 
thing that a collection of small firms can do and more?” (131). He suggests 
that one large (merged) firm may be unable to sustain desirable differences 
in compensation plans across separate units because of the disharmony it 
creates among the firm’s lower paid workers. Even though synergies may 
exist in the merger of two firms, these benefits can be more than offset by 
the costs of integrating disparate workforces. United Airlines’ highly pub- 
lic analysis of a bid for USAir is a good example. Although United’s man- 
agement acknowledged substantial operating synergies between the two 
airlines, United cited the carrier’s high labor costs and the expected diffi- 
culties combining the two workforces in its decision not to acquire USAir. 
Our analysis of the USAir-Piedmont case reveals the thorny labor rela- 
tions issues that exist in airline mergers more generally. While these issues 
exist in varying degrees in other industries as well, we conjecture that they 
are especially challenging in the airline industry for several reasons. First, 
labor costs account for a larger proportion of operating expenses for air- 
lines (especially for carriers that predate deregulation) than they do in 
most industries. Second, labor unions, especially the pilots’ and mechan- 
ics’ unions, have considerable hold-up power in the airline industry since 
flight crews and mechanics develop skills that are specific to aircraft and 
costly to replace. Third, since the airline industry is  a service industry, 
worker disharmony can substantially damage an airline’s brand name. Fi- 
nally, airlines face unique regulations, such as the Railway Labor Act, that 
affect the integration of  workforces. Later, we  present evidence showing 
that the long-run stock price performance of acquiring airlines is highly 
negative. 
This paper is  organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides background 
information on USAir and Piedmont, describes the rationale and struc- 
ture of the merger, and discusses the regulatory and organizational issues 
that delayed the implementation of  the Piedmont-USAir merger for al- 
most two years. We  also present premerger financial data for the airlines 
and document a substantial difference in the labor costs of Piedmont and 
1. Seth Schofield, former chairman and chief executive officer at USAir, interview by  au- 
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USAir in section 5.2. Section 5.3 shows that the stock market did not view 
the Piedmont acquisition as unwise during 1987, when the acquisition was 
initially announced  and approved. Section 5.4  describes the decline in 
USAir’s performance after the integration of Piedmont and documents 
that the principal source of the decline is the increase in USAir’s labor 
costs. In section 5.5, we  discuss factors that contributed to USAir’s poor 
performance after the merger, including the integration and organizational 
policies it adopted. Section 5.6 provides concluding comments. 
5.2  USAir’s Acquisition of Piedmont 
Before examining the effect of the Piedmont acquisition on USAir’s per- 
formance, it is useful to describe some background information on USAir 
and Piedmont, the strategy behind the acquisition, and the takeover pro- 
cess that led to the acquisition. 
In  retrospect, USAir’s acquisition  of Piedmont had several elements 
that might have predicted the postmerger problems that USAir experi- 
enced. First, before the merger, USAir was generating substantial cash 
flow but had low growth opportunities in its existing markets. Given that 
USAir management owned a small percentage of stock, it had the profile 
of  a firm that  suffered from the agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen 
1986). Second, the acquisition came on the heels of a major consolidation 
of the airline industry-ten  airline mergers had occurred in the two years 
prior to the Piedmont acquisition. USAir management felt that it had to 
acquire or be acquired, and hastily proceeded to acquire PSA and Pied- 
mont. Third, and relatedly, USAir placed the survival of the organization 
ahead of the interests of shareholders. Fourth, USAir management had a 
track record for avoiding confrontation with employees, which might have 
suggested a substantial increase in its postmerger labor costs. Finally, as a 
regional airline, USAir did not have the infrastructure to seamlessly digest 
an acquisition as large as Piedmont. 
Notwithstanding  these considerations, as we  show below, the market 
generally did not anticipate the postmerger problems that USAir would 
experience. Hence, while it is tempting to criticize the strategy behind the 
acquisition, there were few negative signals conveyed to USAir manage- 
ment at the time. 
5.2.1 
USAir 
USAir began in 1939 as All American Aviation providing mail service 
in isolated communities throughout Appalachia. It changed its name to 
Allegheny Airlines in  1953 upon offering passenger air travel on short- 
haul routes in the Northeast. Between 1939 and 1978, USAir’s predecessor 
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company acquired two smaller regional airlines-Lake  Central Airlines in 
1968 and Mohawk Airlines in 1972. By  the time price and entry regula- 
tions were lifted in 1978, Allegheny Airlines had a reputation as a margin- 
ally profitable regional airline. 
In 1979, shortly after deregulation, Allegheny Airlines changed its name 
to USAir, Inc., to reflect its growing service network and to signal its inten- 
tion to expand nationally. Like most major airlines, the company estab- 
lished a holding company structure after deregulation. In  1983, USAir 
Group was formed as the holding company for USAir, Inc., which became 
the wholly owned subsidiary through which USAir Group conducted its 
airline business. Shortly thereafter, USAir Group acquired two small com- 
muter airlines-Pennsylvania  Commuter Airlines in 1985 and Suburban 
Airlines in 1986. By  the end of 1986, USAir Group owned four subsidiar- 
ies: USAir, Inc., the two commuter airlines, and U.S. Leasing and Services, 
a small aircraft leasing company. By the end of 1986, USAir offered ser- 
vice  to more than one hundred cities and seventy-seven airports within 
the United States. 
Piedmont 
Piedmont Aviation was founded in 1940 as a small regional airline pro- 
viding passenger air travel in the Southeast. Like Allegheny Airlines, its 
counterpart in the Northeast,  Piedmont concentrated its operations on 
short-haul markets. 
In early 1986, Piedmont Aviation acquired Greensboro High Point Air 
Services, a small commuter airline with operations in North Carolina and 
Virginia. After deregulation, Piedmont acquired two other small airlines- 
Henson Aviation, a regional airline with operations in the Southeast, and 
Empire Airlines, which operated in upstate New York. Piedmont also ac- 
quired Aviation Supply Corp. in 1983, which sold and distributed aircraft 
parts and equipment. By  1986, Piedmont Aviation consisted of Piedmont 
Airlines, its principal division, and two wholly owned subsidiaries engaged 
in aviation sales and services, though Piedmont, like USAir, earned 95 
percent of its consolidated revenues from passenger sales. By  the end of 
1986, Piedmont provided service to one hundred U.S. cities and seventy- 
five airports. 
USAir and Piedmont h Performance, 1979-86 
During the early years of deregulation, the major trunk airlines with- 
drew from many of the short-haul markets served by  USAir, Piedmont, 
and other regional airlines. Under regulation, trunk lines were encouraged 
to serve short-haul markets by a fare structure that provided cross-subsi- 
dies from travelers on long-haul routes to those on short-haul routes. With 
the elimination of cross-subsidization, the major airlines largely conceded 
the short-haul routes to regional airlines with fleets of smaller aircraft. 244  Stacey R. Kole and Kenneth Lehn 
By  1986, USAir and Piedmont dominated the short-haul markets in the 
Northeast and Southeast, respectively. USAir developed a hub in  Pitts- 
burgh through  which it provided  frequent passenger  service to smaller 
cities in the Northeast, such as Allentown, Bethlehem, Albany, Syracuse, 
and  Rochester.  Piedmont  maintained  its  principal  hub  in  Charlotte 
through  which  it provided  frequent  air  service to smaller cities in  the 
Southeast, such as Asheville, Fayetteville, and Columbia, South Carolina. 
Piedmont also operated smaller hubs in Dayton, Ohio, and at Baltimore/ 
Washington  International  Airport.  Both  airlines  maintained  fleets  of 
smaller planes (e.g., DC-9s and Boeing 727s and 737s) allowing them to 
achieve high load factors in the smaller markets that fed traffic into their 
hub operations. “Fortress” hubs and route structures provided USAir and 
Piedmont with a major strategic advantage in the deregulated environ- 
ment-both  were considered to be less vulnerable to the intense fare com- 
petition that prevailed on other routes in the early 1980~.~  It was perceived 
that the traffic on the USAir and Piedmont routes was sufficiently light to 
deter substantial entry by other airlines (Rotbart 1984; Stevens 1984). 
Both USAir and Piedmont enjoyed unusually high profit rates during 
the early years of deregulation. Figure 5.2 shows the annual ratio of op- 
erating income to operating revenue for both airlines and an industry port- 
folio from 1978 to  1986.3  The figure shows that throughout the period, 
USAir and Piedmont consistently outperformed the industry with oper- 
ating margins of  8.6 percent and 8.0 percent for USAir and Piedmont, 
respectively, versus an operating margin of  1.6 percent for the industry 
portfolio. In fact, USAir and Piedmont typically ranked among the most 
profitable airlines. The revenues of both airlines also grew rapidly during 
this period. From 1978 to 1986, the operating revenues of USAir and Pied- 
mont grew by 224 percent and 812 percent, respectively, compared with 
67 percent for the industry portfolio. By  the end of  1986, the two former 
regional carriers were among the ten largest airlines in the country. 
The stock prices of both companies increased substantially during the 
years  1979 to  1986. Figure  5.1  shows that  USAir’s cumulative net-of- 
market stock return for the period was 75 percent; figure 5.3 shows a cor- 
responding return of 130 percent for Piedmont. Whereas Piedmont’s cu- 
mulative returns had been highly negative during the first few years of 
deregulation, they increased sharply in  1981. In contrast, USAir’s returns 
had generally been positive from the outset of deregulation. A Wall Street 
Journal article (Byrne 1983) discussing the winners and losers of deregula- 
2. Rotbart (1984) quotes an official of a mutual fund that specializes in airline stocks as 
saying that “Piedmont and USAir get competition occasionally on point-to-point routes, 
but you can’t compete with their hub and spoke systems.” 
3. The industry portfolio consists of nineteen airlines that were publicly traded in 1978. It 
includes Alaska, Aloha, American, Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Frontier, Hawaiian, 
Northwest, Ozark, Pan Am, PSA, Republic, Southwest, Texas, TWA, United, and Western. 0 12 
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Fig. 5.2  Ratio of operating income to operating revenue for USAir, Piedmont, and 
an  airline index, 1978-86 
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Fig. 5.3  Piedmont's cumulative monthly net-of-market return, 1978-87 246  Stacey R. Kole and Kenneth Lehn 
tion referred to USAir and Piedmont as two of three “notable successes” 
in the industry, with Southwest being the third. 
Notwithstanding  the  similarities  in  their  strategy, size,  and perfor- 
mance, USAir and Piedmont differed greatly in their cost structures. Bai- 
ley,  Graham, and Kaplan (1985) document that  USAir had the highest 
cost per available seat mile (ASM) in the industry in 1982, even controlling 
for its relatively short flight length.4 The major source of USAir’s higher 
costs was its high labor costs, and while other airlines began reducing their 
labor costs around deregulation, USAir did not. 
5.2.2  Rationale behind USAir’s Acquisitions 
In the mid- 1980s the airline industry experienced a rapid consolidation 
of assets through merger and acquisition activity. Figure 5.4 shows little 
activity among NYSE and AMEX  traded  airlines during the first few 
years of deregulation, followed by  a large spike in mergers from 1985 to 
1987.5  Former USAir chairman Edwin Colodny attributes this pattern to 
the fact that airlines grew simply by flying where they wanted during the 
early years of deregulation.6 By the mid-l98Os, he argues, the cumulative 
growth of established airlines and the entry of new airlines led to excess 
capacity that was rationalized through a flurry of mergers. From March 
1985 through November 1986, the airline industry experienced ten merg- 
ers involving seventeen airlines, including the major trunk airlines and re- 
gional carriers such as TWA, Ozark, Northwest, and Republic. 
In a May  1986 speech to the American  Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics,  USAir  chairman  Colodny  expressed  skepticism  about 
“merger mania”  in  the airline industry, stating that the  “consolidation 
trend is thought by many to be the logical follow-on phase of deregulation, 
with the larger carriers gobbling up the small, weak, and vulnerable. . . . 
The assumption that bigger is better should not be blindly accepted.” Col- 
odny went on to discuss the implications of the merger trend for USAir: 
“[Mlany financial commentators and others keep talking about the need 
for ‘critical mass,’ suggesting that a carrier must be some preordained size 
in order to survive. When I hear critical mass, I recall what it really means. 
Critical mass is ‘the amount of a given radioactive material necessary to 
sustain a chain reaction at a constant rate.’ Does this mean an airline could 
reach critical mass and explode? Ifso, perhaps USAir should continue as a 
projtable, northeast niche carrier” (italics added). 
Colodny’s skepticism about airline mergers was based on both his own 
experience and the problems that other airlines were experiencing with 
4.  Bailey et al. (1985, 92) report USAir’s cost per ASM (10.5 cents) exceeds Piedmont’s 
5. We refer the reader to Comment and Schwert (1995) for a discussion of the data. 
6. Edwin Colodny, former chairman and chief executive officer of USAir, interview by 
(8.6 cents) by more than 20 percent. 
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deregulation-era mergers. Colodny was executive vice president for legal 
affairs at Allegheny Airlines when USAir’s predecessor company acquired 
Lake Central and  Mohawk before deregulation. Although he acknowl- 
edges that both acquisitions contributed to the development of the Pitts- 
burgh  hub, there were  the difficulties of  integrating the acquired com- 
panies’  labor  agreements with  Allegheny’~.~  A  critical  issue  was  the 
integration of pilot seniority lists. For example, is a Mohawk captain with 
twenty years of experience on Mohawk’s small aircraft senior to an Alle- 
gheny captain with ten years of experience on Allegheny’s more sophisti- 
cated fleet? These difficulties led to a codification of regulations referred 
to as the “Allegheny-Mohawk’’ labor protective provisions (LPPs) which 
protect the interests of airline employees in a merger. These provisions, in 
combination with the Railway Labor Act, became the industry standard 
for integrating labor agreements in airline mergers. 
Colodny also observed the  problems that  other  airlines experienced 
after mergers. For example, in  1979, almost immediately after deregula- 
tion, Pan Am acquired National in an attempt to build a domestic airline 
to complement its international routes. Rather than operate National as 
an independent subsidiary with its own labor agreements, Pan Am merged 
National into Pan Am. Martin Shugrue, a former senior executive at Pan 
Am, believes that decision “cost Pan Am its future” (Peterson and Glab 
1994, 90). By merging National’s labor contracts into Pan Am’s more gen- 
I.  Ibid. 248  Stacey R. Kole and Kenneth Lehn 
erous labor agreements, Pan Am’s costs increased dramatically.*  In addi- 
tion to increasing the compensation levels of the former National employ- 
ees, Pan Am extended its restrictive union work rules to National, further 
increasing its costs and lowering the productivity of the new employees. 
Since deregulation, other acquiring airlines including Republic, Texas, and 
Northwest have experienced problems associated with the integration of 
an acquired airline’s workforce. 
Despite his reservations about acquisitions, Colodny ultimately came to 
the view that USAir had to “acquire or be acquired” (Payne 1989). With 
its strong franchise in the Northeast and as one of the few remaining inde- 
pendent regional airlines, USAir was an attractive target. Carl Icahn, then 
chairman of TWA, had acquired a 4.9 percent stake in USAir early 1986 
and, in Colodny’s words, was “making noise about an acquisition of US- 
Air,”9 Furthermore, the Department of Transportation  (DOT) approved 
every merger proposed postderegulation, making it unlikely  that  DOT 
would  oppose another  airline’s acquisition  of  USAir.  In  1986, USAir 
added a poison pill to antitakeover amendments it had adopted, revealing 
that it viewed itself as a viable takeover target. 
In 1986, Colodny initiated preliminary discussions with several airlines 
about a possible combination. He had been interested in expanding US- 
Air’s operations in California for some time based on the size of the Cali- 
fornia market.’O USAir had direct flights from Pittsburgh to San Francisco, 
Los Angeles, and San Diego, but it had few routes serving other cities on 
the West Coast. USAir saw expansion into California as an opportunity 
to enhance the productivity of its resources.’’ Since planes could not fly 
back from California to Pittsburgh after 10 P.M., USAir’s planes and crew 
often lay idle in California. If USAir had additional routes on the West 
Coast, it could make more efficient use of these resources by flying up and 
down the coast. 
In 1985, United acquired Pan Am’s  Pacific routes, which immediately 
gave it a large presence in California. Speculation grew that other airlines 
would follow suit by  acquiring one of the three major  regional airlines 
serving California-AirCal,  Western, and PSA (Harris 1986). USAir ap- 
proached AirCal, arguably the most compatible of the three because of its 
small fleet of Boeing 737s. However, USAir and AirCal could not agree 
on an acquisition price, and shortly thereafter AirCal was acquired by 
American for $225 million. Delta acquired Western in September 1986, 
8. Peterson and Glab (1994) quote another former executive at Pan Am as stating “basi- 
cally what happened  is that Pan Am ended up capitulating and paying all the National 
people at the higher Pan Am rates-which  was suicide. That ensured they could never, ever 
run a successful domestic system” (90). 
9. Interview with Colodny, see note 6. 
10. Ibid. 
1 1. Randall Malin, former senior vice president of marketing at USAir, interview by au- 
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leaving PSA as the only remaining independent regional airline with sub- 
stantial operations in California. 
Colodny turned his attention to PSA. As an intrastate airline not sub- 
ject to regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), PSA offered air 
service within California at fares below those of interstate airlines. It was 
known as a “fun” airline that adorned its planes with a smile, served gra- 
nola cookies, and clad flight attendants in  hot pants during the  1970s. 
Once a highly successful carrier, PSA experienced financial difficulties af- 
ter deregulation as low-cost entrants and its established competitors began 
to compete on price. Colodny “quickly reached an agreement” with Paul 
Barkley, the chairman of PSA and PS Group (the holding company for 
PSA), whereby USAir would acquire PSA for $17 per share, or about $400 
million. The two airlines announced the agreement on 8 December 1986, 
subject to the provision that USAir could agree with PSA’s  unions over 
the terms of their employment at USAir. 
At the same time that Colodny pursued PSA, he was holding talks with 
William Howard, the chairman of  Piedmont Aviation, about a possible 
merger of USAir and Piedmont. Colodny and Howard had talked about 
a merger in early 1986, but could not agree on a management structure 
for the new company. Colodny’s interest in a combination with Piedmont 
was renewed after a September meeting with Carl Icahn in which Icahn 
expressed interest in  acquiring USAir. Attracted  by  USAir’s  high labor 
costs,  Icahn  intended  to reduce  USAir’s  labor  expenses  by  imposing 
TWA’s  lower pay scales and more demanding work rules on USAir em- 
ployees in a merger of the two companies.12  Colodny resolved to maintain 
USAir’s independence, in part because of his concern about the implica- 
tions of a TWA takeover for USAir employees and the communities US- 
Air served. 
Piedmont was always the most desirable merger partner for USAir, ac- 
cording to Seth Schofield, who was executive vice president of operations 
in  1987 and later became Colodny’s successor as chairman and CEO of 
USAir.I3 Piedmont had  “tremendous consumer loyalty in the Southeast 
and was just a terrific airline,” according to Sch0fie1d.l~  Its routes were 
contiguous to USAir’s  with little overlap. A combination of USAir and 
Piedmont would blanket the entire eastern part of the United States and 
provide USAir with strong routes in Florida, where it had been expanding. 
The two  airlines also had  the  same unions  and  similar aircraft  fleets, 
which, it was thought at the time, would facilitate integration of the two 
airlines.15 
By  the end of  1986, USAir management concluded that to survive as 
12. Interview with Colodny, see note 6. 
13. Interview with Schofield, see note 1 
14. Ibid. 
15. Interview with Malin, see note 11. 250  Stacey R. Kole and Kenneth Lehn 
an independent company it would have to make a large acquisition. This 
assessment was based on the increasing importance of frequent flier pro- 
grams and the perceived need to offer an expanded route structure to re- 
tain the loyalty of USAir customers. Intent on being a survivor, Colodny 
viewed Piedmont as its most attractive target. The timing was tricky, since 
USAir was focusing on the integration of PSA. Nonetheless, USAir man- 
agement felt an urgency to proceed-they  were convinced that if USAir 
and Piedmont did not combine, both would become targets.I6 
5.2.3  Structure of the Piedmont Merger 
A decision to make a bid for Piedmont was prompted in January 1987 
when Norfolk Southern, which owned almost 20 percent of the equity in 
Piedmont, disclosed in a 13-D filing that it would explore a possible acqui- 
sition of  Piedmont. Colodny contacted the chairmen of both Piedmont 
and Norfolk Southern to indicate USAir’s interest in acquiring Piedmont. 
On 13 February, USAir made an unsolicited bid for Piedmont. It submit- 
ted two alternative proposals to the Piedmont board: either a pure stock 
swap consisting of $71 in USAir stock (consisting of no less than 1.55 and 
no more than 1.9 USAir shares) for each Piedmont share, or a mixed cash/ 
stock offer consisting of $34 in cash and $34 in USAir stock (consisting 
of no less than 0.74 and no more than 0.91 USAir shares) for each Pied- 
mont share. On 17 February 1987, a special committee of the Piedmont 
board recommended that the full board accept a $65 per share cash offer 
from Norfolk  Southern  and reject  the proposals  submitted  by  USAir. 
USAir sweetened the bid  on the next day, to $71 per share in cash for 
the first 50.1 percent of the Piedmont shares and $73 per share in stock 
(consisting of no less than 1.55 and no more than 1.9 USAir shares) for 
each remaining Piedmont share. The following day,  19 February, the spe- 
cial committee of  Piedmont’s board  withdrew its support for Norfolk 
Southern’s offer and stated that it would invite other bids for the company. 
USAir’s bid for Piedmont was complicated on 21 February, when Carl 
Icahn contacted Colodny to indicate his interest in a TWA-USAir combi- 
nation. Colodny rebuffed Icahn and continued to discuss a merger with 
Piedmont. On 3 March, Colodny and Howard reached tentative agree- 
ment on a merger agreement, which they presented to their respective 
boards the next day. On the day of the two board meetings, TWA disclosed 
that it had a 9.9 percent stake in USAir and was proposing to acquire 
USAir for $52 per share. In a letter to USAir, TWA chairman Icahn stated 
that  “we believe  that  your  other  shareholders  would  prefer  our cash 
merger proposal for USAir  over USAir’s  proposed acquisition of  Pied- 
mont” (Agins and Cohen  1987). Icahn also raised  the possibility of a 
16. Dwain Andrews, vice president  of  labor  relations at USAir, interview by  authors, 
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merger of all three airlines--USAir,  Piedmont, and TWA. He indicated 
that if  USAir rejected his proposal, he might make a tender offer directly 
to the USAir shareholders. On 4 March, USAir’s board rejected TWA’s 
offer, stating that it is “grossly inadequate and not in the best interests of 
USAir Group or its shareholders, employees or  passenger^."'^ Colodny 
stated that TWA’s  offer was “nothing more than an attempt by Carl Icahn 
to disrupt at the 1  Ith hour” USAir’s acquisition of Piedmont.18 
Two days later, on 6 March 1987, the Piedmont and USAir boards unan- 
imously approved a restructured  merger agreement in which Piedmont 
would be acquired by  USAir for $69 per share in a cash offer valued at 
$1.59 billion on a fully diluted basis. USAir restructured its offer from a 
mixed cash/stock offer to a pure cash offer in order to expedite the acquisi- 
tion of Piedmont-a  cash offer avoids the delays associated with SEC 
registration requirements and shareholder votes in stock deals. Restruc- 
turing the offer as a pure cash deal required USAir to arrange a credit 
facility to  provide the  cash for  the  offer. Within  three  weeks,  USAir 
reached agreement with a syndicate of commercial banks, led by  Manu- 
facturers Hanover, for a $2 billion credit facility. Meanwhile, a federal 
court temporarily blocked TWA from buying more USAir shares. Shortly 
thereafter, TWA  dropped its bid  for USAir.  Subject to regulatory ap- 
proval, USAir’s bid for Piedmont was successful. 
5.2.4  Regulatory Approval 
Under section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, acquisitions of 
federally certificated airlines must be approved by the DOT.19 The DOT is 
required to use  the “public interest” criteria, which is  defined in  section 
102 of the Act to include the effect of an acquisition on competition and 
the quality of services in the airline industry. In addition, section 102 de- 
fines the public interest to include the ‘heed to encourage fair wages and 
equitable working conditions for air carriers.” Parties wishing to acquire 
an airline must file an application with the DOT, which then conducts an 
investigation of whether the proposed acquisition is in the public interest. 
Concurrently, the DOT invites the public to comment on the proposed 
transaction. As an artifact of airline deregulation, an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) within DOT makes a recommendation to the assistant secre- 
tary for policy and international affairs, who has final authority for ap- 
proving the acquisition.20 
17. USAir rejects TWA’s  takeover proposal of $52 a share, or more than $1.6 billion, Wall 
18. Ibid. 
19. This authority originally resided with the CAE. It was transferred to the DOT when 
20. Prior to deregulation, an ALJ at the CAB would make a recommendation to the board, 
Street Journal, 6 March 1987, p. 4. 
the CAB was abolished in 1984. 
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On 22 March  1987, the DOT restricted  USAir  from acquiring more 
than 5 1 percent of Piedmont’s common stock, pending its approval of the 
acquisition. USAir proceeded with its cash tender offer of $69 per share 
for 50.1 percent of Piedmont’s shares, which would be held in a voting 
trust until the DOT approved the deal. On 6 April, USAir announced that 
92 percent of the Piedmont shares had been tendered and that the offer 
would be prorationed, as required by  the Williams Act of 1968. Pending 
DOT approval, USAir would acquire the remaining 49.9 percent of Pied- 
mont’s shares at the same $69 price plus interest. 
In an order relating to USAir’s application, the DOT indicated that 
USAir would provide standard labor protective provisions to USAir and 
Piedmont employees. In late April, USAir confirmed formally that gener- 
ous labor protective provisions, which had been standard in airline merg- 
ers during the period of CAB regulation, would be offered to the two sets 
of employees. At that point, all affected labor parties, except the Interna- 
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), waived 
further participation  in  the regulatory  proceeding.  This effectively ren- 
dered labor issues moot in the regulatory process. 
The DOT’S investigation of USAir’s proposal centered on the competi- 
tive effects of a USAir-Piedmont merger. America West Airlines had filed 
an objection to the merger on grounds that it would provide USAir with 
market power in the East and allow it to preclude entry, especially at La- 
Guardia and Washington National Airports. The states of Massachusetts, 
New York, and West Virginia initially opposed the transaction, but with- 
drew their objections after receiving assurances about the levels of fares 
and services from USAir. After investigating the effects of a USAir-Pied- 
mont combination on competition, the Department of Justice and the 
DOT’S public counsel independently chose not to oppose the merger. 
On 21 September 1987, administrative law judge Ronnie Yoder recom- 
mended that the DOT reject the merger on grounds that it “would sub- 
stantially  reduce competition”  in  some short-haul markets in the east. 
Colodny described the decision as “incomprehensible” and stated that the 
merger had  been  “carefully planned  to avoid the consumer  and labor 
problems” that had been experienced in other airline mergers (McGinley 
and Valente 1987). On 30 October, assistant secretary Matthew Scocozza 
rejected the ALJ’s recommendation and approved the USAir-Piedmont 
merger without condition, paving the way for the integration of Piedmont 
into USAir. 
5.2.5 
At the time of  its initial  bid  for Piedmont,  USAir  indicated  that it 
planned  to operate Piedmont as a wholly owned subsidiary for at least 
nine  months after  DOT approval  of  the  acquisition. During  the  nine 
months, it would develop a strategy for merging Piedmont’s personnel, 
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assets, and operations into its own  and  “seek to identify . .  . operating 
efficiencies”  between the two airlines, such as rationalizing schedules and 
redeploying aircraft.21  After the transition  period,  Piedmont would  be 
merged into USAir and the Piedmont name would cease to exist. 
After receiving DOT approval, Colodny reiterated USAir’s plan to op- 
erate Piedmont as an independent subsidiary for at least nine months. He 
indicated that this was intended to avoid the labor and service problems 
that other airlines had experienced after hastily integrating the workforces 
and operations of acquired airlines. In a 1988 speech at a Salomon Broth- 
ers conference, Colodny stated that “we do not rush headlong into com- 
bining companies . . . you have all seen what happens when airlines do 
not take enough time.”22  Colodny’s strategy was endorsed by many, includ- 
ing the Wall Street Journal, which stated in an editorial that “part of the 
public’s dissatisfaction with air travel stems from the highly publicized 
service problems that resulted from some recent mergers. Efforts to inte- 
grate work forces were poorly handled, and the proposed USAir-Piedmont 
merger would benefit from those mistakes. . . . integration problems would 
be minimized by an agreement  that the merger would not take place for at 
least nine months afer the approval by DOT” (italics added).23 
Perhaps the most challenging task during the transition period was the 
integration of  the Piedmont and USAir workforces, which included the 
integration of  seniority lists, pay scales, and work rules. As required by 
collective bargaining agreement, the integration of pilot seniority lists was 
left to the USAir and Piedmont Master Executive Councils of  the Air 
Line Pilots Association. This process alone took roughly five months and 
ultimately  involved the use  of  arbitrati~n.~~  In addition,  USAir had  to 
reach transition agreements with each group of employees to reconcile the 
Piedmont collective bargaining and employment agreements with those 
of USAir. 
To facilitate FAA approval of the integration, USAir adopted a “mirror 
image” strategy developed for the PSA acquisition. Prior to the merger, 
USAir and Piedmont had been regulated by the eastern and southern dis- 
tricts of the FAA, respectively. Colodny recalled that the two districts had 
different regulations, which in part accounted for the different operating 
procedures at the two airlines.25  Since USAir was the acquiring airline, the 
merged entity would be regulated by  the FAA’s  eastern district. Hence, 
USAir could either extend its procedures to Piedmont’s operations or it 
21, Piedmont Aviation Schedule 14d-1, Securities and Exchange Commission, 9 March 
1987, p. 20. 
22. Remarks by  Edwin I. Colodny, chairman & president,  USAir Group, Inc., Salomon 
Brothers Transportation Conference, New York, 10 November  1988. 
23. Merger myopia. Wall Street Journal, 19 October 1987, p. 30. 
24. Interview with Malin, see note 11. 
25. Interview with Colodny, see note 6. 254  Stacey R. Kole and Kenneth Lehn 
could seek FAA approval to use a mix of Piedmont and USAir procedures. 
Since Colodny perceived that the latter might jeopardize FAA approval, 
USAir chose to blanket the newly acquired airline with USAir’s operating 
procedures, which were already approved by the FAA’s eastern district. 
In a 1989 interview, Schofield stated that the mirror image strategy was 
devised to “make the two operations look alike in every aspect so that the 
competency was then transferable from one operating certificate to an- 
other” (Ott-Washington 1989). This required extensive retraining of Pied- 
mont employees, including pilots, flight attendants, and mechanics.  By 
the summer of 1989, an estimated eight hundred thousand hours of such 
training had occurred (Ott-Washington 1989). 
Twenty-two months after receiving DOT approval, the integration  of 
Piedmont into USAir was complete. The Piedmont planes were painted 
with the USAir logo, and on 5 August 1989, the Piedmont name ceased to 
exist. 
5.2.6  Comparative Premerger Data on USAir, Piedmont, and PSA 
Table 5.1 presents  premerger data that  highlight the similarities and 
differences between Piedmont, PSA, and USAir before the two acquisi- 
tionsZ6  The size data in table 5.1 show the USAir-Piedmont union to be a 
merger of equals and that both of these airlines were substantially larger 
than PSA. USAir  and Piedmont had comparable profit rates that were 
higher than PSA and the two airlines had similar investment rates, capital 
structures, load factors, and revenue yields. In contrast with USAir and 
Piedmont, PSA had  a lower investment  rate,  load factor,  and revenue 
yield, and a higher ratio of debt to value. 
The data also reveal some significant premerger differences between 
USAir and Piedmont. As mentioned in subsection 5.2.1, the cost struc- 
tures of the two airlines differed. Labor costs represented a larger percent- 
age of USAir’s higher operating expenses while nonlabor components of 
costs-fuel,  rentals  and landing fees, travel  agency commissions,  and 
maintenance-accounted  for similar percentages of operating expenses at 
USAir and Piedmont. Except for rentals and landing fees, which are sub- 
stantially higher at PSA, these costs accounted for comparable percent- 
ages of operating expenses at PSA. 
Another notable difference between USAir  and Piedmont  shown in 
table 5.1 is their premerger stock price performance-USAir’s  was sub- 
stantially worse than Piedmont’s. From January  1984 through  October 
1986 (i.e., two months before the first announcement of USAir’s bid for 
PSA), USAir’s cumulative net-of-market return was -  29.8 percent versus 
1.1 percent for Piedmont and 6.7 percent for PSA. Figure 5.5 plots stock 
26. Unless otherwise noted, we list the mean value of each variable from 1984 to 1986, the 
last three years that Piedmont and PSA were independent entities. Table 5.1  Summary Financial and Firm Characteristics  Data for Piedmont, PSA, 
and USAir, 1984-86 
Piedmont  PSA  USAir 
Size 
Operating revenues ($millions) 
Book value of assets ($millions) 
Market value of assets ($millions) 
Number of employees 
Operating expenses ($millions) 
Percentage of operating expenses 
Cost structure 
accounted for by: 
Personnel costs 
Fuel costs 
Travel agency commissions 
Rentals and landing fees 
Maintenance costs 
Performance 
Operating income as a percentage of 
Net income as a percentage of market 
Cumulative net of market stock returns 
operating revenue 
value of common 
(“YO),  January 1984LOctober 1986 
Investment policy 
Operating working capital as a percentage 




Rates of networking capital to total assets 
Annual revenue growth rate, 1984-86  (%) 
Value Line’s projected long-run revenue 
Market to book ratio 
Market to gross equipment ratio 











Revenue passenger miles (millions) 
Available seat miles (millions) 
Passenger load factor (%) 
Break even load factor (%) 
Revenue yield (“YO) 
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Fig. 5.5  Cumulative net-of-market monthly returns, 1984-86:  A, USAir; B, 
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returns during this period for the three airlines, revealing two sharp de- 
clines in USAir’s  stock price-a  decline of more than 20 percent during 
August-November  1985 and one of almost 30 percent during February- 
July 1986. 
The first decline is  difficult to explain with USAir-specific news  an- 
nouncements; the only announcements in the  Wall Street Journal report 
increases in passenger traffic, an agreement to buy Fokker jet  airliners, 
and an earnings announcement in October. The second decline has more 
obvious explanations. In early March 1986, USAir had announced selec- 
tive fare cuts in response to cuts by People Express and Eastern, signaling 
that USAir increasingly would be involved in fare wars. Later in March, 
Texas Air announced a proposed acquisition of Eastern, with the inten- 
tion of lowering Eastern’s labor costs. USAir’s stock price fell by  3 percent 
on the announcement of the bid,*’ suggesting that the market viewed the 
Texas-Eastern combination as a viable threat  to USAir’s  market domi- 
nance in northeastern markets. During the month of March, USAir’s re- 
turn was -7  percent. Its market-adjusted stock price fell another 20 per- 
cent in May-June,  a period in which it had a near collision and announced 
a decline in May’s  passenger traffic. The substantial  decline in USAir’s 
stock price during mid-1985 through  1986 reveals growing pessimism 
about USAir’s fortunes immediately prior to its acquisitions of PSA and 
Piedmont. 
Data on the liquidity and growth opportunities for the three airlines 
indicate that USAir had the most cash and the lowest growth opportuni- 
ties. Combined with its high profitability, these data suggest that USAir 
had the profile of a firm with substantial free cash flow. USAir’s cash ratio 
was more than four times higher than Piedmont’s. At the end of 1986, US- 
Air had $336 million (15 percent of total assets) in cash versus $65 million 
(4 percent of total assets) for Piedmont. Similar, albeit less dramatic, pat- 
terns exist for the other liquidity measures listed in table 5.1. PSA was 
substantially less liquid than USAir and Piedmont. 
Using several proxies for growth options, we  find that Piedmont had 
more growth potential than USAir at the time of the merger. During the 
years 1984 to 1986, its operating revenue grew at almost three times US- 
Air’s annual rate (i.e., 26 percent versus 9 percent). Value Line’s five-year 
projection of annual revenue growth was higher for Piedmont, as were 
its market-to-book and market value to gross equipment ratios. These data 
suggest that  USAir was more likely  than Piedmont  to suffer from the 
agency costs of free cash flow, given its lower growth opportunities, higher 
liquidity, and high profit rates. 
27. USAir’s net-of-market return over the three days surrounding the first announcement 
of  Texas Air’s  bid for Eastern was -3.1  percent. The NYSE Composite was used  as the 
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5.3  Market Assessment of USAir’s Acquisitions 
During most of the period spanning USAir’s agreement to acquire PSA 
and final DOT approval of the Piedmont acquisition, USAir’s stock price 
performed well.  Figure 5.6 shows USAir’s cumulative daily abnormal re- 
turns from November  1986 through  December  1987, a period  that  in- 
cludes the  October  stock market crash.  Careful  inspection  of  USAir’s 
stock price reaction around key events during this period suggests that the 
market was skeptical of the PSA acquisition, but not the Piedmont merger. 
Table 5.2 lists key announcement dates during the period and the corre- 
sponding abnormal returns on those dates. 
On 8 December 1986, the date that USAir announced the agreement to 
acquire PSA, USAir experienced a statistically significant abnormal re- 
turn of  -4.6  percent; the cumulative abnormal return  (CAR) over the 
three days surrounding the announcement was -9.4  percent, representing 
a loss of roughly $100 million in shareholder value. Consistent with the 
view that the market was skeptical of a USAir-PSA combination, USAir 
sustained negative abnormal returns on the days that the shareholders of 




Fig. 5.6  USAir’s cumulative daily abnormal returns, 1 November 1986 through 
31 December 1987 (the period spanning its PSA and Piedmont acquisitions) Table 5.2  Chronology of Events Concerning USAir’s Acquisitions of PSA and Piedmont and 
the Corresponding Abnormal Daily Stock Return for USAir on These Event Dates 
Date  Event 
USAir’s Abnormal 


























10-  19-87 
10-29-87 
10-30-87 
USAir agrees to acquire PSA for $400 million 
DOT approves USAir’s acquisition of PSA 
USAir proposes merger with Piedmont 
Special committee of Piedmont’s board recommends that 
Piedmont accept Norfolk Southern’s bid and reject USAir’s bid 
USAir sweetens its bid for Piedmont 
Piedmont’s board rejects both Norfolk Southern’s and USAir’s 
bids and invites other bids for the company 
TWA contacts USAir about a possible TWA-USAir combination 
Chairmen of USAir and Piedmont reach tentative agreement on 
merger of the two companies 
TWA discloses a 9.9% stake in USAir and announces a proposal 
to acquire USAir for $52 per share 
Piedmont and USAir announce that they have reached agreement 
for USAir to acquire Piedmont for $69 per share 
Federal judge issues temporary restraining order prohibiting TWA 
from buying more shares in USAir, pending further ruling 
TWA announces that it is “reassessing” its bid for USAir 
TWA calls off its bid for USAir 
Shareholders of PSA and PSGroup approve USAir’s acquisition 
of PSA for $400 million 
DOT announces it will restrict USAir from acquiring Piedmont, 
pending its approval; TWA says it will not interfere with USAir‘s 
acquisition of Piedmont 
TWA sells its stake in Piedmont 
USAir reaches agreement with banks for $2 billion credit line to 
finance acquisitions of PSA and Piedmont 
USAir says its offer for Piedmont is oversubscribed 
DOT denies USAir’s request for expedited approval of its 
Piedmont acquisition 
USAir’s acquisition of PSA is jeopardized by Teamsters union 
local 
USAir reaches agreement with Teamsters, clearing way for PSA 
acquisitions; USAir also announces $400 million offering of 
common stock 
USAir’s acquisition of Piedmont is running into opposition at 
DOT 
Administrative law judge recommends that DOT reject USAir’s 
acquisition of Piedmont 
USAir may have to modify its acquisition of Piedmont to gain 
DOT approval 
USAir takes hard line and states it won’t restructure the Piedmont 
deal 
Stock market crash 
DOT expected to approve USAir’s acquisition of Piedmont with 
modification 






























***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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percent on 17 March 1987) and the Teamsters union local approved some 
changes in  its collective bargaining  agreement to clear the way  for the 
acquisition (-5.7  percent on 18 May  1987). The inference to be drawn 
from the abnormal return on the latter date is complicated by the fact that 
USAir announced a $400 million equity offering on the same day, an event 
normally associated with significant stock price declines. Further clouding 
the issue, USAir enjoyed a 4.7 percent abnormal return  on 28  January 
1987, the day that the DOT approved the PSA acquisition. Taken together, 
the abnormal returns on the four announcements suggest at least some 
market skepticism about the PSA acquisition. 
The evidence on the Piedmont acquisition is much clearer-there  were 
no signals that the market thought this was a foolhardy acquisition. Per- 
haps most convincingly, USAir’s market-adjusted stock price fell by more 
than 6 percent during 17-22  September, a period spanning initial reports 
that the Piedmont acquisition was running into trouble at DOT. Similarly, 
USAir’s stock had a large positive CAR of  11 percent from 28 October 
through 2 November, when contrary to expectations the DOT approved 
the Piedmont acquisition without condition. 
In fact, it is hard to read any skepticism about the Piedmont deal from 
USAir’s stock returns during its initial bidding for Piedmont. From  12 
February through 18 February, USAir’s stock had a CAR of 4.5 percent. 
During this period, USAir submitted its initial merger proposal to Pied- 
mont, had it rejected, and then sweetened the bid. On  19 February, the 
day that Piedmont’s board rejected USAir’s bid and announced it would 
invite additional bids, USAir’s abnormal return was -4.9  percent (signifi- 
cant at the 1 percent confidence level). On 6 March, the day that Piedmont 
and USAir announced that they had reached agreement on a restructured 
deal, USAir’s abnormal return was a significant 5.4 percent. These data, 
combined with the evidence on the reaction of USAir’s stock price to the 
DOT decisions, suggest that  the market looked favorably on a USAir- 
Piedmont combination. 
The steep increase and subsequent decline in  USAir’s stock price in 
March reflects the effect of TWA’s  merger proposal and the ultimate with- 
drawal of its proposal. On 4 March, the day TWA announced both its 
stake in USAir and the merger proposal, USAir’s abnormal return was 
1 1.5 percent. On 9 March, the day a federal judge issued a temporary re- 
straining order against further stock purchases by TWA, USAir sustained a 
-6.2  percent abnormal return. These data indicate that the market be- 
lieved at the time that USAir’s shareholders would be better served by  a 
TWA acquisition  of USAir  than by  a USAir  acquisition  of Piedmont. 
Based on the evidence above, however, it favored a Piedmont acquisition 
over doing nothing. 
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and analysts’ reports about the benefits of a USAir-Piedmont combina- 
tion. Analysts praised USAir’s move: “the USAir-Piedmont combination 
will form one of the most powerful and profitable competitors in the in- 
dustry” (Ross and McGinley 1987); “you now have a presence that can 
compete effectively east of the Mississippi and build competition in the 
transcontinental markets to cities on the West Coast” (Ross and McGin- 
ley 1987); “USAir will cover the eastern U.S. like Sherwin-Williams paint, 
and they will have enormous marketing clout” (Agins and Morris 1987). 
Edmund Greenslet of Merrill Lynch, whose opinion of the acquisition is 
quoted on the first page of this paper, was a lone dissenting voice. 
5.4  USAir’s Postmerger Performance 
USAir’s performance began to deteriorate immediately after the inte- 
gration of  Piedmont in  August  1989. In the subsections that follow, we 
document the decline in USAir’s profitability and the component cost and 
revenue trends. 
5.4.1  Profitability 
Table 5.3 lists performance data for a simulated USAir-Piedmont-PSA 
combination during 1984-86,  hereafter referred to as USAir*, and the 
actual combination during the years 1989 to 1995. Data for USAir* dur- 
ing 1984-86  are computed simply by adding the relevant data for the three 
companies. Ratios are computed on a value-weighted basis. We  exclude 
the intervening years of 1987 and 1988 when PSA (1987) and Piedmont 
(1988) were neither independent nor fully integrated into the USAir system. 
As seen in panel A of the table, the ratio of operating income to revenue 
for USAir* ranges from 8 percent to 11 percent during the years 1984 to 
1986. This ratio falls to 0.3 for the newly merged company in 1989 and is 
followed by five years of operating losses. A similar pattern emerges with 
data on the ratio of operating income to book asset value. 
The deterioration  in  net income, shown in panel  B,  is  considerably 
worse. From 1984 to 1986, USAir* had aggregate net income of $522 mil- 
lion, ranging between $166 and $184 million. From 1989 to 1994, USAir 
accrued over $3 billion in losses. Net income expressed as a percentage of 
the book value of common stock was -4  percent in 1989, -3  percent in 
1990, and  -28  percent in  1991. Thereafter, the book value of common 
stock becomes negative, rendering this percentage meaningless. Net in- 
come expressed as a percentage of  the market value of common stock 
varies from -266  percent to -4  percent during 1989-94.  The extraordi- 
nary value of net income in 1992 includes a charge of $982 million related 
to grounded aircraft and USAir’s accounting for postretirement benefits 
under the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s FAS 106. Table 5.3  Profitability Measures for Simulated Merged Company Consisting of 
USAir, Piedmont, and PSA (USAir*), 1984-86, and USAir, 1989-95 
A. Operating Income ($millions) 
Operating Income as a Percentage of: 









































B. Net Income ($millions) 












Book Value of  Market Value of 
Net Income  Common Stock  Common Stock 
175  14.2  13.9 
184  11.4  11.3 
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-393 
















C. Economic Value Added 
Return on  Cost of Capital  Economic Value Added 
































-  1,085 
-1,012 
-955 
-  622 
-  926 
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Table 5.4  Operating Profit as a Percentage of Operating Revenue 

























Panel C of  table 5.3 presents measures of  USAir’s  economic profits, 
including Stern Stewart’s estimates of USAir’s return on invested capital, 
cost of capital, and “economic value added” (EVA).28  It shows that USAir 
(i.e., not USAir* since the database did not include data for Piedmont and 
PSA) generated returns in excess of its cost of capital in each year from 
1984 to  1986. However, during the years  1989 to 1994, USAir’s  annual 
economic returns range from  -5.3  percent to 2.2 percent, and in each 
year USAir fell short of earning its cost of capital. 
By  every measure, USAir’s performance plummeted after the merger. 
Part  of  this decline is related to generally poor industry  conditions in 
1990-92.  Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1989 and the subsequent 
war in the Persian Gulf increased oil prices, and concurrently, fears of 
terrorism dampened passenger demand. In addition, a recession (1991- 
92) and a new wave of low-cost entrants eroded the profitability of airlines 
generally during this period.  To  adjust for this, we  compute operating 
profits as a percentage of revenues for a portfolio of  established airlines 
that survived as public companies during the entire period from 1989 to 
1995.29  This value-weighted profit measure for the industry versus USAir 
is shown in table 5.4. In contrast to the premerger period, when Piedmont 
and USAir had profit rates that were 6-7  percentage points higher than 
the industry average, USAir’s  profit rate was 2.6 percentage points less 
than the industry average over the postmerger period. 
5.4.2  Cost Changes 
A principal reason for USAir’s  sharp decline in performance after the 
merger is a large increase in its costs. Table 5.5 shows that from 1984 to 
1986 USAir*’s cost per ASM ranged from 8.8 to 9.1 cents then jumped 
to  10.5 cents  following implementation  of  the  merger  and  increased 
28. The Stern Stewart Performance 1000, Stem Stewart Management Services, New York, 
29. The portfolio includes Alaska, American, Delta, Southwest, and United. 
1995. EVA is a registered trademark of Stern Stewart. Table 5.5  Cost Data for Simulated Merged Company Consisting of USAir, Piedmont, and PSA (USAir*), 1984-86, and USAir, 1989-95 
Costs Expressed as a Percentage of Operating Revenues 
Cost per ASM  Operating Expenses  Travel  Rentals and 
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Table 5.6  Personnel Cost Data for Simulated Merged Company Consisting of USAir, 
Piedmont, and PSA (USAir*), and USAir, 1989-95 
Actual  Simulated  Present Value 
Personnel Costs  Personnel Costs  Difference  of Difference 
Year  (in $billions)  (in $billions)  (in $millions)  (in $millions) 
1989  2.211 
1990  2.617 
1991  2.521 
1992  2.624 
1993  2.841 
1994  2.890 






















monotonically thereafter.30  Among the components of costs, labor costs 
increased substantially after the merger. In addition to mandating some 
more  labor-intensive procedures  companywide, usually  high  turnover 
among employees added to USAir’s  large training expenses and further 
reduced labor productivity (Payne 1989). Table 5.5 shows that the ratio of 
personnel costs to operating revenues increased from 0.33 in  1984-86  for 
USAir* to 0.39 in 1989-95  for USAir. 
The increase in personnel costs has a large effect on the value of USAir. 
To  estimate this effect, we  first compute the difference between USAir’s 
actual personnel costs and what personnel costs would have been if US- 
Air  had  maintained  its premerger ratio  of  personnel costs to revenues 
(equal to 0.327). This difference is listed in table 5.6 on an annual basis, 
along with present value calculations as of  1987 that assume a discount 
rate of 10 percent (i.e., Stern Stewart estimates USAir’s 1986 cost of capi- 
tal is 10.4 percent). The sum of the present value of the difference in per- 
sonnel costs over the period  1989-95  is  $1.9 billion, representing more 
than two-thirds of the shareholder value lost after the acquisition. 
Table 5.5 reveals that nonlabor costs changed as well after the merger. 
Fuel costs declined dramatically, reflecting generally lower energy prices 
during the postmerger period.  Maintenance  costs increased during the 
first few years after the merger but thereafter declined to premerger levels. 
Rentals and landing fees increased substantially from the premerger to 
postmerger period, presumably reflecting a substitution of aircraft leasing 
for aircraft ownership. Travel agency commissions increased slightly over 
the period. 
30. Although not a perfect substitute for controls that account for inflation and industry 
trends, there is other evidence that shows USAir continues to have the highest cost per ASM 
in the industry. A  1996 Goldman Sachs airline report finds that in  1995 USAir’s cost per 
ASM was 11.48 cents versus an industry average of 9.02 cents. In early 1996, USAir’s cost 
per ASM increased to 13.23 cents versus an industry average of 9.34 cents. 266  Stacey R. Kole and Kenneth Lehn 
Table 5.7  Revenue and Revenue Growth Data for Simulated Merged Company 
Consisting of USAir, Piedmont, and PSA (USAir”), 19-6,  and 
USAir, 1989-95 
Operating  Annual Revenue  Value Line Long-run 
Revenue  Growth Rate  Projected Annual Revenue 
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5.4.3  Revenue Growth 
In addition  to incurring  substantially higher costs after  the merger, 
USAir revenue growth slowed. As table 5.7  shows, USAir* enjoyed an 
annual revenue growth rate of about 14 percent in 1984-86, while USAir’s 
revenue growth rate in the postmerger period ranged from only -  1  percent 
to 7 percent. Analysis of the 1989-95  period suggests reversion to the 
mean: revenue growth for the seven-year period is 19 percent for USAir 
and 20 percent for the industry as a whole. 
In addition to showing USAir’s actual revenue growth rate, table 5.7 
lists Value Line’s projected revenue growth for USAir* in the premerger 
period and USAir in the postmerger period. It shows a substantial decline 
in USAir’s projected revenue growth, from 13 percent in 1989 to as low as 
-  10 percent by  1995, which is the lowest projected growth rate of any U.S. 
airline covered by Value Line. As discussed later, possible reasons for the 
decline in revenue growth are service problems experienced immediately 
after the merger and some high profile crashes of USAir planes. 
5.5  Discussion 
5.5.1  Transition from a Regional to a National Airline 
USAir’s name change from Allegheny in  1979 was intended to signal 
the transformation of a regional airline into a national carrier with an 
extensive network of routes across the United States. In the early years 
of deregulation, USAir fortified its Pittsburgh hub, acquiring commuter 
airlines in Pennsylvania and expanding cautiously into new markets in- 
cluding  Florida  and Arizona,  though  with  limited  service. A  map  of Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of  Value in Mergers  267 
USAir’s route structure in its 1985 annual report reveals a mass of short- 
haul  routes  in  the Northeast  and  scattered  spokes reaching west  and 
south. 
A reasonable question to ask is whether the USAir organization was 
prepared in 1986 to step into the shoes of a national airline. Examination 
of the successful players in the national market at that time-American, 
United, Delta-reveals  a set of management teams with increasingly large 
marketing and pricing groups, significant investments in information tech- 
nology, and deep benches of individuals ready to assume management re- 
sponsibility. 
At USAir, the organizational infrastructure appeared somewhat frail. 
Closely managed by  a small team of individuals with little experience at 
major airlines, middle and upper-level managers had limited decisionmak- 
ing rights. The hierarchical organization that thrived in the early years of 
deregulation had failed to produce a large pool of  management talent. 
This limited USAir’s ability to manage the near tripling of size generated 
by the PSA and Piedmont acquisitions. 
When USAir extended itself to the west with the PSA acquisition and 
to the south with Piedmont, its information systems were outmoded. On 
more than one occasion post-1989, the firm’s payroll process broke down 
and secretaries at USAir headquarters were assigned to manually type 
 paycheck^.^' As an indication of how far behind USAir was in the area of 
information technology, an estimated five hundred man-years of resources 
were devoted to information technology coordination between 1989 and 
1991.32 
USAir also was late in offering its customers a frequent flier program. 
At a time when other airlines were exploring alliances with other carriers 
and travel-related businesses to enrich the attractiveness of their programs, 
USAir was just introducing a program. Edwin Colodny strongly opposed 
the development of a frequent flier program, believing that there were bet- 
ter ways of building brand loyalty. “I thought they were one of the worst 
developments in the industry,” Colodny stated, adding that he was “hop- 
ing that they would go away.”33  This may help explain USAir’s failure to 
recognize the cost of discarding the valuable Piedmont and PSA brand 
names. 
At the time of the PSA and Piedmont acquisitions, USAir did not have 
access to a major computer reservations system. USAir’s participation in 
the purchase  of  the Apollo reservation system gave  the airline an  11.3 
percent stake in that system but did not alter the fact that USAir’s sched- 
31. Interview with Schofield, see note 1. 
32. John Harper, chief financial officer at US Airways, interview by authors, Washington, 
33. Edwin Colodny, former chairman and chief executive officer of USAir, telephone con- 
D.C.,  1 April 1996. 
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ules and ticket pricing were presented to travel agents via a shared system. 
Consequently, USAir relied more heavily on financial incentives for travel 
agents to generate business than did other airlines. 
Finally, the procedures  relating to labor management  that were ulti- 
mately extended to the more than fifty thousand employees of USAir post- 
merger were designed for a small airline. One example that illustrates the 
mismatch between the firm’s size and its procedures pertains to the re- 
placement requirement. At most airlines, if  a flight crew wants to drop a 
flight from its schedule, the crew (or crew member) must find a substitute. 
At USAir, management is obligated to locate the replacement. What this 
means is that scheduling for six thousand pilots on any given day is not 
finalized until 4:00 P.M. on the day prior to the travel date. While the man- 
agement at USAir would like to rewrite outgrown policies, such as the re- 
placement requirement, they can only alter such practices with the agree- 
ment of labor. 
From the history of the Piedmont merger presented in subsection 5.2.3, 
it is clear that this defensive acquisition was hastily arranged. If, as was 
stated in 1979, USAir intended to expand into a nationwide carrier, they 
neglected to develop the firm’s organizational infrastructure to support 
such growth. 
5.5.2  USAir’s Postmerger Labor Policy 
Prior  to  industry  deregulation,  labor  protective  provisions  or LLPs 
(financial  accommodations extended  to the employees of  an acquired 
carrier) were invoked in all airline mergers. For example, employees who 
remain  employed but  are “placed  in  a worse position  with  respect  to 
compensation” were entitled to monthly  differential payments  for four 
years. Acquiring airlines were required to pay dismissed workers an allow- 
ance equal to 60 percent of average monthly compensation in the employ- 
ee’s last year of employment for between six and sixty months depending 
on the employee’s tenure.  Provisions also required  generous relocation 
packages for transplanted workers. To satisfy the requirement of “fair and 
equitable” integrating of seniority lists, management typically turned this 
process over to representatives of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), 
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and 
the Association of Flight Attendants (Green 1986). 
Although  the  requirement  that  airlines  offer financial  protection  to 
workers in a merger was relaxed with deregulation, these costly provisions 
did not disappear. The DOT’S stated position was that such issues were 
best left to the collective bargaining process.34  However, DOT’S “concern 
34. In a 1987 internal memorandum to the Department of Transportation’s secretary and 
deputy secretary entitled “Recent Airline Acquisitions: A Preliminary Analysis,” Michael V. 
Scocozza, assistant secretary for policy and international affairs, cited the NWA-Republic 
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that a merger or acquisition not lead to unnecessary service problems” 
left open the possibility that the DOT would oppose a combination “if 
the merging parties did not reach some accommodation with organized 
labor.”35  At the same time, support for LPPs was growing on Capitol Hill: 
a measure requiring their imposition was approved by the House of Repre- 
sentatives in the fall of  1986, only to lose by  a one-vote margin in the 
Senate. In practice, some acquiring airlines voluntarily offered LPPs (e.g., 
Pan Am’s acquisition of National, Delta’s merger with Western) and many 
others negotiated LPPs in their union contracts (e.g., United’s acquisition 
of Pan Am’s Pacific Division). 
The costs of these protections are large. In addition to direct outlays for 
“displacement” allowances and pay differentials, the process of integrating 
seniority lists could impose substantial time costs on airlines. Seniority 
lists are an essential input in assigning crews to aircraft via bidding for 
work schedules. In the case of USAir, the five-month delay of the integra- 
tion process forced the acquiring carrier to maintain separate work crews 
and priority systems for matching aircraft with crews and forestalled the 
efficient utilization of an expanded route structure and fleet. 
Throughout its history, USAir maintained labor peace. Recognizing the 
hold-up potential  of  each union, management actively sought to avoid 
strikes. Cost minimization was not a priority during regulation and US- 
Air’s dominance in northeastern short-haul markets during the early years 
of deregulation perpetuated management’s conciliatory stance at the bar- 
gaining table. Management believed that despite its high cost, a coopera- 
tive labor-management relationship was a key rather than an impediment 
to profitability, 
Talks with PSA’s  unions began prior to the merger agreement. USAir 
came to the bargaining table in a position of strength. In 1985, PSA em- 
ployees agreed to accept some compensation in the form of equity rather 
than cash and USAir’s offer to reinstate certain wages dominated the ex- 
isting pay scheme. In uncharacteristic fashion, USAir sought and obtained 
an agreement to gradually raise the wages  of  PSA workers to USAir’s 
more generous levels. 
The Piedmont acquisition unfolded much more rapidly than did the 
purchase of PSA, leaving little time for preliminary discussions with labor. 
In fact, it is  unclear what estimates of  labor expense USAir used in its 
valuation of Piedmont.36  Once the deal was struck, the unions balked at 
to prevent labor strife that would disrupt the national air transportation  system or unless 
special circumstances of  an acquisition show that LPPs are necessary to encourage fair 
wages and equitable working conditions.” 
35.  Larry  Phillips, economist  at the  DOT,  email correspondence  with  author (Kole), 
20 March 1997. 
36. Regrettably, we  have been unable to obtain the analysis of the merger conducted by 
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USAir’s plan to run Piedmont as a subsidiary with separate labor con- 
tracts. This arrangement would have allowed USAir to preserve Piedmont 
(and PSA’s) lower labor cost as well as provide a valuable option to lever- 
age the separate unions off one another (e.g., Piedmont’s ALPA and US- 
Air’s ALPA). While such an arrangement would have been unpopular with 
labor, and probably would have ended up in litigation, the potential cost 
savings of the separate subsidiary plan was large. 
In the end, USAir agreed to an immediate step-up in wage and work 
rules to bring Piedmont workers into the organization as equals with US- 
Air employees. Demanding equal treatment, USAir surrendered the phase- 
in arrangement struck with former PSA employees. Given the existence of 
multiyear union contracts, the decision to standardize pay and the concur- 
rent decision to homogenize operating procedures institutionalized higher 
costs at the acquired units.37  Whereas USAir may have intended to identify 
and implement  the most efficient methods  of  production  from  among 
PSA, Piedmont, and USAir practices after satisfying FAA competency 
requirements, the codification of higher pay and more generous work rules 
in collective bargaining agreements created entitlements that still plague 
USAir’s cost structure. We  conclude that the cost of preserving internal 
equity at USAir was huge. 
5.5.3  Was the Increase in Labor Costs a Surprise? 
The stock price evidence discussed in section 5.3 suggests that at the 
time of the merger the market did not anticipate the USAir’s labor costs 
would increase by as much as they did. The data suggest that the market’s 
approval of the merger was predicated on maintaining Piedmont’s labor 
costs at roughly their premerger level. To examine this, we  contrast US- 
Air’s actual postmerger financial data with projections made by Goldman 
Sachs in July  1988, more than one year before the integration of  Pied- 
mont into USAir. The actual and predicted data for  1989 are shown in 
table 5.8. 
The data show that USAir’s operating income in 1989 fell short of Gold- 
man Sachs’ estimate by $448 million. The reason for the difference is that 
USAir’s actual operating expenses exceeded Goldman Sachs’ expectations 
by  $590 million. Goldman had projected labor costs of $2.07 billion in 
1989, representing 32 percent of projected revenues. This estimate is al- 
most identical to the simulated personnel costs discussed in section 5.4, 
which assumed that the relation between Piedmont’s (and PSA’s) revenues 
37. The standardization of departure procedures, as an example, led to the hiring of an 
estimated one thousand additional mechanics (at $18 per hour plus benefits) to “push back” 
aircraft on the tarmac at Piedmont gates, a job that had been performed by  part-time gate 
crews (college kids earning $6.75 an hour without benefits). In-flight staffing also increased 
at Piedmont as a result of mirroring USAir’s teams of four flight attendants; for comparable 
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Table 5.8  Comparison of USAir’s Actual and Projected Results for 1989 
Actual 1989 Results  Projected 1989 Resultsa 
Revenue ($millions) 
Operating expense ($millions) 
Operating income ($millions) 
Interest expense ($millions) 
Net income ($millions) 
Available seat miles 
RPM 
Load factor (%) 
Cost per seat mile (cents) 
Break even load factor (%) 
Labor expense ($millions) 
Compensation per employee ($) 
Fuel expense ($millions) 
Rentals and landing fees ($millions) 
































Note: n.a. = not available. 
aGoldman  Sachs projection, 28 July 1988. 
and labor costs would be maintained under USAir ownership. In reality, 
USAir’s actual labor expense turned out to be $2.3 billion or 36 percent 
of  operating revenue in  1989, and it increased to 40 percent of revenue 
thereafter. If the Goldman Sachs estimate is representative of market sen- 
timent at the time, the data suggest that  the labor policies adopted by 
USAir in  1988-89  were largely unanticipated by the market. The Gold- 
man Sachs estimates also reveal that USAir’s cost per ASM and its nonla- 
bor costs exceeded expectations. USAir’s revenue and load factor actually 
exceeded Goldman’s projections, further suggesting that the major source 
of USAir’s postmerger problems were related to unexpectedly high costs. 
5.5.4  Corporate Culture and the Mirror Image Strategy 
Although economists typically sidestep the issue of corporate culture (a 
notable exception is Kreps 1990), in every interview, whether with union 
leaders or management, we  were implored to take this notion seriously. 
The “stuff you can’t see on paper, the attitudes that are hard to measure,” 
Colodny told us, “can have an amazing impact.”38 
The acquisition and integration of PSA’s workforce challenged USAir’s 
more conservative management. Known for its playful manner, even cus- 
tomer safety briefings were tongue-in-cheek at PSA: “For those of  you 
who have not been in an automobile since 1962, this is a seat belt. . . I’ To 
a carrier noted for its smiling nose cones and in-cabin games, assimilation 
into USAir’s  stricter procedures and rules meant  the loss of  a style of 
38. Interview with Colodny, see note 6. 272  Stacey R. Kole and Kenneth Lehn 
customer service that PSA viewed as a strength. However, for the strug- 
gling carrier whose employees held a 15 percent equity stake, USAir’s ac- 
quisition was a windfall and an opportunity to earn increased wages. This 
undoubtedly lessened the sting of losing PSA’s identity. 
In the case of the Piedmont acquisition, both Piedmont and USAir suc- 
cessfully survived the early years of deregulation. However, Piedmont’s 
rate of postderegulation expansion in number of employees, operating rev- 
enue, and ASMs during this period far outpaced USAir’s growth. In 1985, 
Piedmont was honored as the Airline of the Year by Air Transport World 
magazine, an award usually bestowed upon larger airlines. Piedmont was 
touted as having the most sophisticated pricing staff among the regionals, 
a flexible workforce loyal to Piedmont’s founder and still active board 
member, Thomas Davis, and a valuable brand name in the South that was 
synonymous with quality service. Positioned for continued expansion, the 
USAir acquisition was resented by many Piedmont employees who viewed 
theirs as the superior airline. 
USAir’s “mirror image” whitewash of PSA and Piedmont practices re- 
quired the employees of the acquired units to relearn their jobs the USAir 
way. While this certainly imposed personal costs on workers, it is difficult 
to assess how great these costs were and how they were manifested. Cus- 
tomer satisfaction provides some clue to the extent of the problem. If a 
culture clash did exist, one likely manifestation is lower quality of opera- 
tions: increased absenteeism would create scheduling problems, more lost 
baggage, and less satisfied customers. 
USAir had “one of the worst records in the industry (for on-time perfor- 
mance and baggage service) most of 1989 and part of 1990” (Nomani and 
Valente 1990). Data on consumer complaints filed with the CAB and its 
predecessor agency echo these problems. Complaints rose from 1.4 com- 
plaints per 100,000  travelers in 1986 to 3.6 in 1987 and remained above pre- 
merger levels until 1990.39 
Another, extremely crude, measure of quality of operations in the airline 
industry is the frequency of accidents. Postmerger, USAir experienced a 
number of incidences, the most serious of which involved flight 5050 which 
crashed into Flushing Bay soon after taking off from New York’s LaGuar- 
dia Airport on 20 September 1989, killing two passengers. A lengthy FAA 
investigation pointed  to a minimally trained crew and raised concerns 
about crew pairings and the preparation of pilots following the Piedmont 
merger. 
Rather than list the numerous testimonials rich in Civil War analogies 
and regional stereotypes, we have attempted to demonstrate the impact of 
39. In and of itself, this consumer complaint data is not strong evidence of a culture clash 
at USAir. Customer satisfaction deteriorates industrywide at this time suggesting either the 
existence of merger-related problems throughout the industry following a wave of mergers 
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a clash of cultures at the integrated USAir. While not definitive, they are 
suggestive of  real integration  problems that  adversely effected  USAir’s 
performance postmerger. 
5.5.5  Reversability of Mergers 
USAir’s acquisition of Piedmont raises an issue that, to our knowledge, 
is largely unexplored in the economics and finance literature: What deter- 
mines the ease with which acquirers can reverse “bad” acquisitions? Re- 
search has found that the probability of divesting acquired firms or assets 
is inversely related to the effect of the acquisition on the acquiring firm’s 
stock price (Kaplan and Weisbach 1992; Mitchell and Lehn 1990). Not- 
withstanding the central tendency, however, some value-reducing acquisi- 
tions, such as USAir’s  acquisition of  Piedmont, do not result in subse- 
quent divestitures. This raises a natural question: Why not? 
Despite a general recognition that USAir’s acquisition of Piedmont has 
had a large negative effect on USAir’s value, to our knowledge investors 
have not placed pressure on USAir management to reverse the acquisition 
through  a  divestiture of  the  Piedmont  assets. We  asked  analysts and 
USAir officials about the feasibility of a divestiture; the uniform response 
was that it was infeasible, since the Piedmont and USAir assets are now 
so integrated that  it would be impractical to undo the merger. Michael 
Armellino, managing  director  and former  airline analyst at  Goldman 
Sachs, states that you can’t  “unscramble this egg.”40  This suggests an in- 
verse relation between the probability that a bidder divests itself of an 
unsuccessful acquisition and the degree to which it has integrated the ac- 
quired firm into its own  operation^.^^ 
5.5.6  Generalization to Other Airline Mergers 
The evidence presented in this paper shows that USAir dissipated huge 
amounts of  value after its acquisitions of Piedmont and PSA, largely be- 
cause it was unable to maintain labor costs at their premerger levels. While 
the problems encountered by  USAir are more dramatic than most, indus- 
try experts have commented on the general difficulty of integrating work- 
forces in airline mergers. For reasons discussed above, we conjecture that 
the integration of labor is more problematic in airline mergers than it is in 
less heavily unionized, less regulated mergers. This leads us to the follow- 
ing question: Is postmerger performance different for acquiring airlines 
than it is for acquiring firms in other industries? 
Anecdotally, much has been written about problems encountered by 
large acquirers in the airline industry, including Pan Am, TWA, and Texas, 
40.  Michael Armellino, managing partner  and former  director  of  research,  Goldman 
41. This discussion also suggests that the option to reverse an acquisition should be consid- 
Sachs, interview by  authors, New York, N.Y., 16 July 1996. 







Index Month (Month 0 IS Month of  Merger Announcement) 
Fig. 5.7  Cumulative monthly net-of-market returns for acquirers in eighteen 
airline mergers, 1979-91,  from twelve months before the acquisition announcement 
each of which filed for bankruptcy. It is worth noting that there has been 
little merger activity in the airline industry since the mid-1980s. To  our 
knowledge, the only merger involving an established airline during this 
decade is United's  acquisition  of West Air Holdings' Air Wisconsin in 
1991. The paucity of recent merger activity is consistent with learning- 
after the acquisitions of the mid-l980s, managers of airlines are opting to 
buy routes, gates, and slots rather than suffer the integration of two work- 
force~.~* 
Much of the existing work on airline mergers focuses on the impact of 
mergers on airfares (Borenstein 1990; Slovin, Suskha, and Hudson 1991; 
Kim and Singal 1993; Singal 1996). We  are unaware of any systematic 
evidence on the relation between mergers and long-run performance in 
the airline industry. Preliminary results on long-term stock returns for ac- 
quiring airlines appear in figure 5.7.43  The figure plots cumulative monthly 
net-of-market returns for a portfolio of eighteen acquirers of airlines dur- 
ing 1978-91  from twelve months prior to the acquisition announcements 
42. The decline in merger activity in the airline industry also is consistent with the argu- 
ment that antitrust policy became more stringent during the Bush and Clinton administra- 
tions than it was during the Reagan years. We thank Severin Borenstein for pointing this out. 
43. Two  recent papers discuss estimation problems associated with the measurement  of 
long-run stock returns. See Kothari and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997). Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of Value in Mergers  275 
through sixty months after the announcements.44  It shows highly negative 
returns several years beyond the acquisition. Cumulative returns are nega- 
tive three years after the acquisition for eleven of the fifteen surviving 
acquirers  (three did not  survive three years postmerger) and twelve  of 
fourteen acquirers had negative cumulative returns five years after the ac- 
quisition (four acquirers failed within five years of the acquisition). 
To control for size and industry effects, we estimate the long-run abnor- 
mal return for each acquiring airline in the following way. For each acquir- 
ing airline, we  identify the airline that had the closest market  value of 
equity at the end of the calendar year immediately preceding the year of 
the acquisition. We then check to make sure that the matched airline did 
not make an acquisition  itself during the five years before through five 
years after the acquiring airline’s acquisition announcement; if it did, we 
exclude it, and go to the next airline that is closest in size to the acquiring 
airline. We  continue this process until we  identify a size-matched airline 
for each acquiring airline. We then compute the abnormal return for each 
acquiring airline as the difference between its buy-and-hold return and the 
corresponding return for the matched airline. 
Table 5.9 lists the results on long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
for acquiring airlines over periods of one, two, three, four, and five years 
after the acquisition announcements. Panel A, which reports tbe results 
for the entire sample, shows an average buy-and-hold abnormal  return of 
-  14.76 percent during the first year following the acquisition announce- 
ment and -47.16  percent during the first five years after the announce- 
ment. The average returns  for two, three,  and four years after the an- 
nouncement lie somewhere between the two numbers. The only return that 
differs significantly from zero is the five-year return. 
Panel B replicates panel A for the twelve acquiring airlines that were 
not themselves acquired after they made their acquisitions. The inclusion 
of the six acquirers who subsequently became targets themselves is likely 
to bias against finding negative long-run returns, since acquisitions are 
associated with significant positive returns for target firms. The results in 
panel B demonstrate the effect of the bias-the  buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns become substantially more negative and significant. The average 
return is -23.25  percent, -30.26  percent, -49.7  percent, -44.13  percent, 
and -40.32  percent, during the one, two, three, four, and five years, re- 
spectively, after the acquisition announcement. With the exception of the 
44. The eighteen mergers include the following (the acquiring airline is listed first): North 
Central-Southern  (1979),  Pan  Am-National  (1979),  Republic-Hughes  (1980),  Texas- 
Continental (1981),  Southwest-Muse (1985), People  Express-Frontier  (1985), Piedmont- 
Empire  (1985), Texas-People  Express  (1986), Texas-Eastern  (1986), Northwest-Republic 
(1986), TWA-Ozark (1986), Alaska-Jet  America (1986), Delta-Western (1986), American- 
AirCal (1986), Alaska-Horizon (1986), USAir-PSA  (1986), USAir-Piedmont (1987), and 
United-Air  Wisconsin (1991). Table 5.9  Buy-and-Hold Stock Returns for Eighteen Acquiring Airlines versus a Control Sample of Other Airlines with Equity Values Closest to 
the Acquiring Airline at the End of the Calendar Year Immediately Preceding the Acquisition 
Number of Months 
after Acquisition 
Average Buy-and-Hold Return (YO)  Number of Observations 
(t-statistic)  (number negative) 
A. Buy-and-Hold Returns for All Eighteen Airlines 
12  -  14.76  18 
(-0.77)  (10) 
24  -  12.40  17 
(-0.74)  (8) 
36  -27.70  16 
(-1.14j  (9) 
48  -30.47  15 
(- 1.29)  (101 
60  -47.16  14 
(-2.21)  (9) 
B. Buy-and-Hold Returns for Twelve Airlines That Are Not Themselves Subsequently Acquired 
12  -23.25  12 
(- 1.04)  (9) 
24  -30.26  12 
(- 1.62)  (7) 
36  -49.70  12 
(- 1.82)  (8) 
48  -44.13  12 
( -  2.53)  (9) 
60  -40.32  12 
(-2.01)  (8) Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of Value in Mergers  277 
one-year return, all are significant at the 10 percent level. In addition, at 
least eight of the twelve airlines experienced negative returns in four of the 
five post-announcement intervals. 
The evidence on long-run returns is consistent with the argument that 
airline mergers are especially hard to manage relative to other mergers. 
Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) document long-run returns of about 
-10  percent for a large sample of acquiring firms over a five-year post- 
merger period,  which is  substantially less negative than the returns we 
find for acquiring airlines. We  conjecture that the postmerger problems 
experienced by  acquiring airlines may account for the large reduction in 
airline merger activity since the mid-1980s. An alternative explanation for 
the reduction in airline activity is that antitrust policy has become more 
binding, given changes in antitrust policy. Also, because of the existence of 
estimation errors associated with measurement of long-run stock returns, 
additional  analysis comparing postmerger accounting profits, economic 
profits, and labor costs for acquiring and nonacquiring airlines would be 
informative. 
One other piece of evidence consistent with the conjecture that the inte- 
gration of workforces discourages airline mergers can be seen in data on 
the frequency of asset sales in the airline industry over time. Asset sales 
usually involve the sale of routes or planes, with no accompanying employ- 
ees.  If the integration of  workforces is  an impediment to mergers, one 
might expect to find a substitution of asset sales for mergers over time. 
To examine this, we  collected data on asset sales in the airline industry 
for each year during 1980-94  from Securities Data Company’s Financial 
Database System. The data indicate that asset sales were infrequent during 
the period of high merger activity in the airline industry. During the eight- 
year period from 1980 to 1987, thirteen asset sales occurred, or roughly 
1.5 per year. Since 1987, there has been little airline merger activity but a 
large increase in asset sales. During the seven-year period from 1988 to 
1994, forty-three asset sales (twenty-eight of  the asset sales occurred in 
1990 and 1991) occurred, or roughly six per year. While there may be other 
explanations for the increase in asset sales, the evidence is consistent with 
the argument that it is easier for airlines to integrate routes and aircraft 
than it is to integrate workforces. 
5.6  Conclusion 
In  1987, USAir’s acquisition of  Piedmont Aviation was praised as a 
perfect match. The combination of  two strong airlines with contiguous 
route structures would  improve the utilization of  aircraft, maintenance 
facilities, and crews. The more extensive route structure would appeal to 
Piedmont and USAir frequent travelers. Indeed, USAir’s rationale for the 
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time. However, as General Robert Oaks, executive vice president of opera- 
tions at USAir, aptly states, “[Ilt’s easier to get accountants to integrate 
balance sheets than it is to combine people who must work together.”45 
USAir stumbled in the implementation process and its present cost struc- 
ture bears the legacy of those missteps. 
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Comment  Severin Borenstein 
Kole and Lehn have done an excellent job describing the challenges that 
an airline faces in integrating workforces as part of a merger. These prob- 
lems, of course, exist in any merger, but as the authors point out, there are 
good reasons to think that difficulties are particularly acute in the airline 
industry. The great hold-up power of pilots’ and mechanics’ unions along 
with the service orientation of this industry-in  which worker attitude can 
have a  tremendous effect on customer satisfaction-make  it likely that 
workforce integration will be a central challenge of any airline merger. 
While the evidence that Kole and Lehn present makes it clear that these 
labor issues were  critical in the disappointing outcome of the USAir- 
Piedmont-PSA  merger, I think that the proportion of the value loss that 
labor costs explain might be overstated. The authors have attempted to 
separate the impact of  the merger from the many other events that oc- 
curred in the industry around that time, which is an extremely difficult 
task. Three factors in particular make it difficult to parse the causes: (1) a 
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crash in the price of  oil in early 1986 changed substantially the relative 
costs of inputs around the time of  the merger; (2) with the exception of 
United, every major airline was involved in  a merger between 1985 and 
1988, thus making interfirm comparisons difficult to interpret; (3) the re- 
cession and Persian Gulf conflict in the early  1990s harmed  the entire 
industry, but each firm in the market was affected differently. 
Furthermore, the cost and inefficiencies of integration that the authors 
document in this case probably overstate the degree of the problem in a 
typical airline merger. Notwithstanding its profitability in the early 1980s, 
USAir was not viewed by most in the industry as a well-managed airline, 
and certainly not as one that was able to control worker compensation. 
Edwin Colodny, the CEO of USAir, was thought by workers to be one of 
the nicest and most generous executives in the industry, a reputation dat- 
ing from before airline deregulation. It is telling that the quotes from ana- 
lysts in support of the merger (at the end of section 5.3) refer to the merged 
carrier’s power, presence, and marketing clout, not to production synerg- 
ies, streamlining, or cost efficiency. Thus, the costs that USAir faced in 
integrating the Piedmont and PSA workforces were probably greater than 
other management teams are likely to encounter. 
The primary approach that Kole and Lehn use to estimate the effect of 
labor force costs on USAir’s postmerger performance is to extrapolate the 
share of revenue that was attributed to labor costs. They take the deviation 
from the earlier share after the merger as indicative of the costs due to 
workforce integration. Yet it is unclear why one would expect this ratio to 
stay constant, particularly through big swings in  demand-the  1990-92 
recession-and  the costs of other inputs-the  oil price crash in 1986 and 
the upward shock following the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. 
To illustrate this, one can recalculate the percentages in table 5.5  under 
the assumption that real fuel prices remained constant at their 1984 level 
for the following decade and that this change was fully reflected in reve- 
nues. The resulting increase in the personnel costs as a share of total reve- 
nue would have been substantially smaller than Kole and Lehn find and 
would explain about 45 percent of the value change following the merger. 
This is still a substantial share, but it points out that the authors’ estimates 
come with  significant margins of  error. The decline in the real cost of 
fuel-which  averaged about 20 percent lower during 1989-95  than during 
1984-86-also  partly  explains why  all other categories increased as a 
share of revenues. 
A similar argument could be made regarding the  1990-92  recession. 
As demand slackens, fixed expenses will naturally rise as a share of total 
revenues. Because of union strength in this industry generally, for all the 
reasons the authors point out, labor costs are relatively fixed, particularly 
compared to fuel, airport fees, travel agent commissions, and a number of 
other expenses that exhibit virtually no stickiness. That, of course, does Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of Value in Mergers  281 
not explain why  the percentage later stayed so high when the economy 
rebounded, demand  increased, and the shadow value of  capacity grew 
once again. Overall, while this approach to measuring the integration costs 
is sensible, it would be more useful if it could in some way account for the 
industrywide shocks that occurred during this time. It would be interest- 
ing, for instance, to see how the rise in labor cost share of revenue com- 
pares to the rest of the industry over the same time. 
In general, it would be valuable to compare many of the premerger and 
postmerger changes with similar measures for other carriers or for the 
industry as a whole. Even these results, however, would have to be inter- 
preted with caution. Most important is the fact that nearly every major 
airline experienced a merger between 1985 and 1987.’ 
The scarcity of nonmerging airlines also makes it difficult to compare 
the performance of  merging and nonmerging carriers. In figure 5.7, Kole 
and Lehn demonstrate that mergers tend to be followed by negative abnor- 
mal returns. While provocative, the result may also be attributed to the fact 
that airline mergers seem to be leading indicators of recessions.2  Nearly all 
mergers in the sample occur just prior to the 1981-82  recession or a few 
years prior  to the  1990-92  recession. Recognizing this, the authors at- 
tempt to do a matched-pair analysis, but given the (reasonable) criteria 
they use for choosing matches, the only available airlines for comparing 
the 1985-87  mergers are United, and possibly Midway and Pan Am. Thus, 
the results of this comparison could be quite idiosyncratic. 
Nonetheless, while Kole and Lehn’s analysis of  the adverse effects of 
airline mergers probably should not be taken as precise estimates, they 
convincingly show that the USAir-Piedmont-PSA  merger was not a suc- 
cess, that labor costs were a significant part of the reason, and that the 
stock market was surprised by this failure. This latter insight is particularly 
surprising given USAir’s reputation for poor management. Furthermore, 
while one can quibble with the analysis of overall returns to mergers in 
this industry, it is fairly clear that mergers have not had the beneficial im- 
pact that was suggested by managers and analysts at the time. 
The authors’ treatment  of  conflicts of  corporate culture is  also a re- 
freshing addition to the economic study of mergers. They do not quantify 
these effects-it  is not clear how one could-but  they do recognize that 
such conflicts play a serious role. In light of the fact that every merger 
faces these issues, and that corporations spend significant sums studying 
how to overcome them, integrating issues of culture conflict into the analy- 
sis of mergers may very well yield new insights. 
1, See authors’ note 44. Only United resisted the urge to merge, but only so far as other 
airlines were concerned. It was during this period that United diversified into a number of 
other travel-related industries, including hotels. 
2. Put differently, airline mergers appear to take place when firms possess substantial free 
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My own discussions with former Piedmont and USAir employees rein- 
force Kole and Lehn’s conclusions. The manager of pricing and yield man- 
agement at Piedmont left the company shortly after the merger and before 
the workforce integration  to work for America West. She reported that 
many others also chose to leave the company rather than work for USAir, 
which had the reputation of being stodgy and rule-bound and of failing to 
reward initiati~e.~  During the 1987 DOT hearing on the USAir-Piedmont 
merger, testimony from USAir managers revealed that the carrier’s pricing 
and seat management system lacked many of the capabilities of those used 
by  American, United,  and even Piedmont. The fact, that, immediately 
after it acquired PSA, USAir painted over the famous PSA smiles on their 
aircraft is consistent with this view  of USAir management. It is worth 
noting that despite the high wages USAir paid and its reputation for very 
friendly relations with labor, most workers at Piedmont did not support 
the merger, and cheers were heard among Piedmont workers on 21 Sep- 
tember 1987 when Judge Yoder recommended that DOT reject the merger. 
The virtual absence of mergers in the 1990s may very well be a result of 
airlines’ coming to recognize the realities that Kole and Lehn present, 
though antitrust policy probably plays a role as well. Many nonmerger 
cooperative arrangements between airlines have developed or spread in 
the decade since the airline merger wave. Though code-sharing existed in 
the 1980s as a way that jet carriers could exchange passengers with com- 
muter airlines while maintaining a single brand, code-sharing is now also 
used between jet  carrier^.^ Likewise, airlines are collaborating in their loy- 
alty programs. Reno Air, for instance, took over many of American’s West 
Coast routes out of San Jose in  1993. Even before it was purchased  by 
American in November 1998, Reno distributed points on American’s fre- 
quent flier program and shared codes with American, and the two carriers 
coordinated the timing of their flights. 
It seems quite likely that these are attempts to gain the advantages of 
coordination and reduction of horizontal rivalry without bearing the costs 
of workforce integrati~n.~  With growing evidence of the pitfalls that merg- 
ers present, including the studies in this volume, further experimentation 
with  forms of  nonmerger  coordination  seems assured.  Studying  these 
mechanisms  for  nonmerger  coordination,  and contrasting  them  with 
mergers, will be a fruitful area for further research. 
3. Personal communication with Marilyn Hoppe, July 1988. 
4. Many of these arrangements are between U.S. and foreign airlines that cannot merge 
because of legal restrictions, but they also now occur between U.S.  jet carriers such as Conti- 
nental and America West. 
5.  The difficulty of workforce integration was highlighted again in February  1999, when 
American’s pilots staged a sickout to protest the pay (too low) and seniority (too high) that 
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Comment  Marc Knez 
The literature on mergers and acquisitions suffers from an almost com- 
plete absence of careful empirical examinations of the organizational fac- 
tors that influence successful or unsuccessful merger implementation. This 
paper, along with the other papers in this volume, represents the first sig- 
nificant step in filling this void. 
As I see it, there are three principal points of interest in this paper. First, 
the authors provide powerful evidence that the postmerger losses incurred 
by  USAir were driven in large part by  their decision to raise Piedmont 
wages to the level of USAir’s. Second, they provide powerful evidence that 
the market all but completely ignored this possibility. Finally, the descrip- 
tion of the events leading up to USAir’s decision to purchase Piedmont 
suggests that the management of USAir were  less concerned about the 
potential for value creation through the merger than they were about their 
own survival in a consolidating industry. Each of these points (and others) 
is of significant interest to those of us attempting to develop a broader 
understanding  of  the  factors  facilitating and  inhibiting the  success of 
mergers. 
One difficulty is the reconciliation of the first two points taken together. 
Is it the case that USAir made an “obvious” mistake when it raised Pied- 
mont wages to USAir’s levels and the market did not believe they would 
make such an obvious mistake? Or instead, is it the case that USAir had 
to raise Piedmont wages and the market simply missed this point? In other 
words, is this a case about mistakes that get made during merger imple- 
mentation, or a case about the market’s ignorance about merger imple- 
mentation? Answering this question requires knowing whether USAir had 
to raise Piedmont wages.  The authors provide a rather  mixed view  on 
this difficult question. In subsection 5.2.4, which describes the regulatory 
approval process, we  are left with the impression that federal approval of 
the merger (nearly) required raising Piedmont wages. On the other hand, 
they conclude that the “decision” to raise wages was a mistake, and that 
USAir “stumbled” in the implementation process. To reconcile this issue 
we would need to evaluate the set of alternative actions that USAir could 
have taken. For example, what were the implications of not raising Pied- 
mont wages; would it have significantly jeopardized regulatory approval? 
If not, would it have led to a strike? How costly would a strike have been? 
If, for the moment, we  accept the conclusion that the management of 
USAir stumbled, there is still the question of why they made such an “ob- 
vious” mistake. The scant literature on merger implementation suggests 
that CEOs tend to be overconfident about their ability to create value in 
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a merger (see, e.g., Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Hayward and Hambrick 
1997). In  this case,  USAir  management  may  have been  overconfident 
about the value created through increased market power emanating from 
the combined route structure, as well as about their ability to reduce costs 
despite the increase in Piedmont wages. 
Beyond the wage issue, the authors also suggest that USAir’s “mirror 
image” strategy of homogenizing operations of the two airlines was a mis- 
take. This is clearly a decision over which they had discretion. They could 
have kept many of the operational  differences in place (at least for an 
extended period of time). But, again, the authors do not provide any in- 
sight on the organizational feasibility or costs of such a decision. To the 
extent that there are real operating synergies that have the potential for 
value creation, we can assume that significant coordination across the op- 
erations of these formally separate airlines would be necessary. If this is 
the case, then the cost of inconsistent operating procedures could conceiv- 
ably be significant. Put differently, it is hard to imagine that it could be 
efficient for an organization in a single line of business to have disparate 
operating procedures  in  different parts of the organization  that are en- 
gaged in practically identical activities. This is particularly true in an in- 
dustry where standard operating procedures are so important. 
The authors quote a former CEO of USAir who states that the mirror 
image strategy “turned out to be an irritant to everyone-PSA  and Pied- 
mont employees and their customers.” Significant organizational change 
is always a source of irritation for participants, but this does not make it 
suboptimal, only inevitable. One way  to reconcile this issue is  to see if 
there are any other airlines that possess heterogeneous operating proce- 
dures to the degree that the authors believe USAir  should have imple- 
mented. 
The two issues I have raised point to the difficulty of this type of re- 
search. If the goal is  to judge the quality of decisions made during the 
implementation process, we must judge these decision against alternative 
choices that could have been made. While it is clearly not possible to turn 
back the clock, it is important to recognize the trade-offs, and in some 
cases insights may be gained from the experiences of other firms that have 
taken an alternative approach. That said, I am sympathetic to the difficulty 
of capturing all these trade-offs, especially since the authors have already 
provided a fairly in-depth description of this particular merger. 
Finally, the authors state that the USAir case provides support for Wil- 
liamson’s (1985) conjecture that internal equity issues can limit the bound- 
aries of the firm. The idea is that maintaining differences in compensation 
across separate units will lead to dysfunctional behavior in the lower-paid 
unit. Hence, whatever benefits arise from the merger of two firms may be 
offset by such dysfunctional behavior. Given that Williamson’s discussion 
on this issue is a bit imprecise, it may be the case that the USAir case Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of Value in Mergers  285 
applies. However, I do not believe it should if the Williamson conjecture 
has any bite. 
Researchers  and practitioners  in  human  resource  management  have 
long recognized that pay equity is a critical element of any compensation 
system. Workers judge whether they are being paid fairly by  comparing 
their pay to the pay of other workers engaged in a similar or related task, 
weighted by their level of contribution relative to this same other worker. 
There are two main sources of distortion here. First, workers may overesti- 
mate their level of contribution  relative to others. Second, their basis of 
comparison will not just be similarity of task, but also, simply working for 
the same organization. The second distortion is most relevant for William- 
son’s conjecture. It is the mere fact that two workers are in the same organ- 
ization that leads to comparison where it would not otherwise occur. In 
other words, there is a psychological difference between the internal and 
external labor markets. A current notable example of  this problem has 
arisen as commercial banks have entered investment banking. Suddenly, 
commercial  bankers feel compelled to compare their  compensation to 
their “colleagues” in the investment banking unit who receive significantly 
higher compensation. Hence, to Williamson’s point, related diversification 
leads to internal equity issues that would not otherwise arise. 
In the USAir case, workers at Piedmont are going to compare them- 
selves with workers at USAir that are doing nearly identical tasks. What 
rationale is there for USAir to pay them differently? Moreover, had the 
merger not occurred, it would have made complete sense for the Piedmont 
employees to point to USAir’s higher wages in future collective bargaining 
sessions, especially since both airlines had the same unions. To be sure, 
the disgruntlement created by two workers doing the same tasks but being 
paid differently influenced USAir’s decision to raise Piedmont wages. But 
this simply reflects disparities in wages between two airlines created in past 
negotiations with the same union. Now we have a single airline anticipat- 
ing negotiations with the same union. 
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